Europe’s best bet for strategic autonomy? Taking control of NATO

NATO is enjoying a geopolitical renaissance. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has jolted the alliance back into relevance, prompting a surge in European defense spending and the historic inclusion of Finland and Sweden. From Washington’s perspective, this is NATO at its best: united, deterrent-focused, and increasingly well-funded. But from Europe’s vantage point, the renewed alliance exposes an unresolved dilemma—how long can the continent outsource its strategic security to a power it cannot fully trust?

Calls for European “strategic autonomy” have circulated for decades, often framed as a long-term ideal rather than an actionable plan. Now, with the specter of a second Trump presidency looming and the global order fragmenting, Europe faces a choice. It can continue to follow Washington’s lead, or it can reshape NATO from within. In this new era of security uncertainty, hijacking NATO—not abandoning it—may be Europe’s most realistic path to geopolitical maturity.

Since its founding in 1949, NATO has operated on a simple transatlantic bargain: the United States provides overwhelming military power, and Europe aligns politically and strategically in return. This arrangement suited both sides during the Cold War and muddled through the post-9/11 era. But today, its assumptions no longer hold. US domestic politics have grown volatile. A sizable share of American voters now question the utility of NATO itself. The Republican Party—once the alliance’s staunchest defender—is increasingly split, with isolationist and transactional impulses gaining ground.

Europe, meanwhile, is waking up to its own vulnerabilities. The Trump administration’s open disdain for NATO, including threats to withdraw from the alliance or withhold defense commitments, wasn’t an anomaly. It was a warning. Even under Biden, the US has made clear that Asia—not Europe—is its primary strategic theater. The message is unmistakable: European security is no longer the center of American grand strategy.

Yet NATO remains structured as if that Cold War balance still exists. The US controls the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) post, dominates planning committees, and drives mission focus. In this context, the idea that Europe should build its own autonomous defense capabilities outside NATO misses the point. NATO is the infrastructure. The challenge is not to reinvent it, but to recenter it around European interests.

The surge in European defense spending is often interpreted as a concession to US pressure. But it is also an opportunity. In 2023, Poland overtook the US in defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Germany reversed decades of pacifism by launching a €100 billion military fund. Nordic countries are investing in interoperability and Arctic defense. For the first time in a generation, Europe is paying into NATO at levels that justify real influence.

So far, that influence has not been fully exercised. NATO missions continue to skew toward US-driven strategic priorities. Past entanglements—like Afghanistan or Libya—reflected American ambitions more than European security concerns. Today, the alliance is increasingly vocal about China, yet many EU states remain cautious, seeking to preserve commercial ties with Beijing even as Washington intensifies competition.

This divergence is not a liability—it’s a prompt. NATO does not have to be anti-China to remain credible. Nor does it need to orient toward Indo-Pacific operations that dilute its core purpose. Europe must use its growing financial and operational weight to push for a recalibration: a NATO that is focused more sharply on threats to European sovereignty, such as Russian hybrid warfare, disinformation, and regional destabilization in the Balkans or Sahel.

This also includes reshaping the command architecture. Europe should push for rotational leadership of key posts, increased funding tied to regionally relevant missions, and the development of integrated EU-NATO planning cells that center European intelligence and doctrine. The US might resist this initially—but as European capabilities grow, the logic of burden-sharing must evolve into one of power-sharing.

Strategic autonomy has long been a rhetorical goal for the EU, but it often feels like a hollow catchphrase. France champions it. Germany qualifies it. Eastern Europe distrusts it. Meanwhile, real operational dependency on the US remains deep, especially in airlift, cyber defense, and space-based surveillance.

But autonomy does not require cutting all ties. It requires optionality—Europe’s ability to act independently when it must, and jointly when it chooses. This is achievable through NATO itself, if the alliance is adapted accordingly.

For instance, the EU could lead the development of regional rapid-reaction forces under the NATO umbrella, focused on European missions. Investment in dual-use technologies like drones, space assets, and AI-based threat detection can serve both EU and NATO needs while reducing reliance on US suppliers. NATO’s Center of Excellence structure could be expanded to house more European-run hubs in cyber, energy security, and information warfare.

Another key dimension is narrative control. As long as NATO remains an extension of US strategic communication, Europe will struggle to define its own geopolitical voice. European officials must speak for the alliance with the same legitimacy as American ones. That means building diplomatic fluency, media visibility, and cultural influence within NATO’s soft power infrastructure.

In short: Europe doesn’t need to exit the US shadow by leaving NATO—it can do so by casting its own.

Europe has the tools, the urgency, and now the momentum to assert strategic control within NATO. Waiting for the perfect EU army or hoping for permanent alignment with Washington are both flawed strategies. The most efficient path to autonomy runs straight through Brussels—but also Mons, Ramstein, and Norfolk. By turning NATO into a dual-core alliance—not just an American-dominated security umbrella—Europe can safeguard its interests, stabilize its neighborhood, and prepare for an uncertain global future. In a world of contested influence, co-opting the institutions that already exist is not betrayal—it’s strategy. NATO’s next evolution should be European-led, not American-dependent.

What Europe needs most is not just capability, but conviction. The institutional muscle of NATO already exists, as does growing European financial input. What remains is the political will to define a European strategic worldview—and use NATO as its amplifier. This means recognizing when US interests diverge, and still choosing to shape the mission rather than follow blindly. It also means building intra-European defense consensus faster, even if it means leaving some hesitations behind.

Europe’s window of opportunity won’t remain open forever. A fragmented world order is forming, and influence will belong to those who act decisively. NATO can either be Europe’s proving ground—or its crutch. The choice is now Brussels’ to make.