Is Iran’s regime running out of time?

For decades, Iran’s regime has been defined by its survival instincts. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the clerical establishment has outlasted war, sanctions, assassinations, protests, and diplomatic isolation. But in 2025, it is no longer obvious that this survival is inevitable. Beneath the surface of the Islamic Republic’s endurance lies a brittle foundation: economic ruin, generational revolt, elite infighting, and geopolitical overreach. The real question is not whether Iran is under pressure. It’s whether that pressure will finally cause the regime to crack—from within.

As Iran’s 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei fades from the political scene without a clear successor, the country is veering into uncharted territory. While external actors like the US and Israel continue to exert force through sanctions and targeted operations, it’s internal forces—disillusioned youth, marginalized minorities, and economic despair—that may ultimately determine the regime’s fate.

This article unpacks the structural weaknesses, internal tensions, and external shocks driving speculation that the Islamic Republic could implode—either suddenly, or in slow, irreversible decline.

1. The Legitimacy Vacuum: A Revolution That Outlived Its Cause

The Islamic Republic of Iran is no longer revolutionary. It’s reactionary. While the slogans of the 1979 revolution still echo through state media—“Death to America,” “Resistance Economy,” “Hijab is dignity”—the population has largely moved on. Over 60% of Iranians are under the age of 35. They didn’t fight the Shah. They didn’t vote for the theocracy. And they don’t believe that the regime serves their interests.

Iran’s young people are not calling for Western liberalism per se. They are demanding basic freedoms: to dress without harassment, to access the internet without VPNs, to work, travel, and speak without fear. Instead, they face morality police, joblessness, and a culture of surveillance. The regime’s legitimacy—built on religious authority and revolutionary pride—means little to a generation shaped by smartphones, exile TikTok, and the brutal suppression of the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.

Even the regime’s traditional support base is shrinking. Clerics in Qom complain privately of declining mosque attendance. Bazaar merchants, once loyal to the ayatollahs, are chafing under economic instability. Reformist politicians, formerly useful as controlled opposition, are now either imprisoned or irrelevant. Elections have become tightly scripted spectacles with record-low turnouts. In short: the system no longer inspires, persuades, or even co-opts. It merely represses.

2. Economic Decay: The Regime’s Achilles Heel

Iran’s economic rot is not just the result of US-led sanctions. It is also homegrown. Mismanagement, corruption, and militarized cronyism have created a dysfunctional economy where hard work rarely pays, and connections to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) are more valuable than business acumen.

Inflation regularly exceeds 40%, wiping out savings. The rial continues to collapse, forcing Iranians to hoard dollars and gold. Youth unemployment hovers around 27%, higher in provinces like Khuzestan or Sistan-Baluchestan. The informal economy—smuggling, black markets, currency trading—thrives, while formal growth stagnates. Skilled workers, doctors, and engineers emigrate in droves.

The IRGC has become an economic conglomerate, controlling everything from construction to telecommunications. But its dominance has undermined innovation, scared off foreign investment, and channeled resources into unproductive sectors. Instead of modernizing the economy, the regime has militarized it.

Ordinary Iranians pay the price. Subsidies are slashed. Utilities are rationed. Rent is unaffordable in cities like Tehran and Mashhad. Even food security is fraying. And the government’s answer? Blame foreign conspiracies, tighten censorship, and criminalize dissent.

3. The Crisis of Succession: Who Comes After Khamenei?

Ayatollah Khamenei has ruled since 1989, longer than any current Middle Eastern leader besides Oman’s late Sultan Qaboos. But at 86, he is visibly frail. Behind closed doors, Iran’s elite are jostling to determine who, or what, will replace him.

The problem is that the Supreme Leader’s authority rests on a combination of religious credentials, political maneuvering, and revolutionary credibility. Few figures today possess all three. Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, is rumored to be the favored successor—but his lack of religious training and overt nepotism make him deeply unpopular. Others, like judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi, lack the charisma or competence to consolidate power.

What’s more, the regime has no institutional clarity on succession. The Assembly of Experts is opaque and politicized. The IRGC may back a strongman. Reformists are sidelined. Clerics are divided. This power vacuum invites instability. A contested succession—especially amid protests or external threats—could fracture the regime’s fragile unity.

As one Tehran-based analyst put it: “The moment Khamenei dies, every faction will try to seize the state. It could be our 1989 Soviet moment.”

4. Proxy Wars and Strategic Overreach

Iran’s regional influence has expanded since the US invasion of Iraq. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria, the IRGC’s Quds Force has built a sprawling network of armed proxies. But this strategy has its costs—and its limits.

Supporting these groups drains Iran’s budget, already constrained by sanctions. It also provokes retaliation. Israeli airstrikes have killed multiple Iranian commanders in Syria and Iraq. The US regularly imposes new designations and embargoes. And now, Tehran risks direct confrontation with Israel over nuclear escalation.

Moreover, these foreign adventures are increasingly unpopular at home. “Why are we funding Lebanon when we can’t afford eggs?” one protester shouted during the 2019 fuel riots. Iranians see these alliances not as strategic triumphs, but as misplaced priorities that deepen their economic misery.

Even among elites, there’s debate. Some IRGC commanders see Syria as a liability. Others believe nuclear weaponization is a national security imperative. These fractures add to the sense that Iran’s foreign policy—once ideologically driven—is now dangerously incoherent.

5. Protest Without Leaders, Revolt Without Reform

One of the regime’s strengths has always been its adaptability. In the past, it survived mass protests by offering concessions—like lifting the ban on satellite dishes in the 1990s or allowing limited presidential competition in the 2000s. But today’s protests are different.

The 2022–2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement broke the mold. It wasn’t led by reformists or political figures. It was led by women, students, and minorities. It was decentralized, creative, and fearless. The crackdown—over 500 killed, thousands arrested—succeeded in ending street marches. But it didn’t end the movement.

Dissent has gone digital. Encrypted messaging, VPNs, and diaspora networks sustain the opposition. Underground art, satire, and flash protests continue. Many activists reject even the idea of compromise. They don’t want reform. They want regime change. This is new. The regime has no answer for it. It can crush visible movements—but not the invisible disillusionment of a whole generation.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is not yet collapsing. But it is decomposing. What once seemed like a permanent fixture of the Middle East now looks more like an exhausted relic—surviving on repression, oil sales to China, and an aging elite’s will to hold on.

The implosion, if it comes, will likely not be cinematic. It may come through a contested succession. Through a gradual fracturing of the security services. Through a moment when the regime gives an order—and nobody listens. Like many autocracies, Iran’s regime looks most powerful just before it breaks.

For policymakers in the West and the region, this is not a call for regime change adventurism. It is a call to watch, support civil society, and prepare for a post-theocracy Iran. For Iranians, the question is no longer whether the regime should fall. It’s when—and what comes next.