Singapore carbon tax revenue 2024 falls short amid industry allowances

The lower-than-expected carbon tax revenue in Singapore—$642 million instead of a projected $1 billion—has less to do with decarbonisation progress and more to do with deliberate transitional hedging. For observers of macro policy and cross-border climate positioning, this revenue gap signals a calibrated state posture: Singapore is pricing carbon more aggressively on paper, but deploying competitive buffers behind the scenes to protect trade-exposed sectors. This isn’t a revenue miss. It’s a reflection of transitional realpolitik.

The carbon tax rate jumped from $5 to $25 per tonne in 2024, theoretically multiplying government revenue by five, assuming emissions remained constant. Instead, the increase yielded a more modest rise from ~$200 million to $642 million. The delta—roughly $350 to $400 million—is attributable to two main policy offsets: transitory allowances and unused carbon credit rollovers.

These aren’t accounting errors. They are designed features in the tax architecture, meant to smooth the adjustment path for emissions-intensive exporters. Petrochemical and refining firms were reportedly granted rebates of up to 76%, while carbon credit usage was effectively deferred into 2025 due to quality supply constraints. Neither factor represents structural failure. Both reflect institutional caution in a globally integrated economy.

This model echoes transitional regimes seen in Sweden and other mature carbon tax systems. Sweden, for instance, has long offered discounts to energy-intensive manufacturers—over 50% for decades—while gradually phasing out relief as cost structures adapted. Singapore appears to be following a similar path: aggressive top-line pricing, backfilled with sector-specific allowances during the early adoption window.

The result is policy posture without economic whiplash. That’s not a contradiction. It’s a sequenced approach to credibility-building.

Critics may argue that rebates and deferred carbon credit usage dull the incentive effect of the tax. And that’s partially true—on a short-term emissions-reduction basis. But strategically, the existence of the tax itself, along with its future trajectory (up to $80/tonne by 2030), sets a price signal that is already being priced into investment horizons.

The credibility of the regime depends less on one year’s revenue and more on the institutional discipline to reduce allowances over time. If the government transparently phases out these buffers—as it has indicated—it can reinforce market trust while avoiding capital flight or production shifts in exposed sectors.

This revenue shortfall isn’t a walk-back. It’s a policy buffer built to protect economic competitiveness while preserving long-term carbon pricing integrity. For sovereign wealth allocators, institutional investors, and regional regulators, the key signal is clear: Singapore’s climate strategy is not a blunt instrument. It’s a calibrated scaffolding. And scaffolding, by design, gets removed as the structure strengthens.