How China, Russia and Israel are redrawing the global map

In today’s fractured geopolitical arena, old alliances are fraying and new partnerships are forming—not always along ideological lines, but often driven by survival, sanctions, and strategic necessity. As the United States’ global footprint shrinks or becomes less consistent, countries once on opposite sides of history are growing closer. What’s emerging is an informal triad of assertive mid-sized powers—Greater China, Russia, and Israel—each reshaping the balance of power in its own neighborhood and beyond.

Each of these nations is leveraging a combination of military might, technological self-reliance, and realpolitik diplomacy to carve out strategic independence. China has doubled down on BRICS and Belt and Road corridors to reduce reliance on the West. Russia, despite sanctions, has forged tactical military and energy alliances from Tehran to Pyongyang. Israel, increasingly isolated in the West, is leaning into new regional pacts and technological supremacy to maintain deterrence. Meanwhile, the US struggles with credibility gaps, domestic distractions, and inconsistent commitments abroad.

This isn’t a neat multipolar system—yet. But what’s clear is that the US-centric world order is giving way to a messier, more competitive landscape where power is more distributed, alliances more transactional, and the rules up for renegotiation.

Beijing no longer seeks approval—it builds alternatives. From the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to the expanding BRICS+ group, China is actively decentering the dollar and reducing reliance on US-led institutions. It is also leading the charge on digital currency infrastructure and transcontinental logistics, quietly redrawing the economic map of Eurasia.

Militarily, China is flexing with calculated ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, forcing neighboring states to hedge rather than align. Its recent détente with Gulf nations and deepened ties with Russia suggest a growing ambition to act as both a stabilizer and a spoiler.

Economically, China's slowdown may dull its shine, but its global leverage is increasing—particularly in regions where Western investment is retreating. For many developing countries, China remains the lender, builder, and partner of last resort.

Far from being isolated, Russia has reoriented its entire foreign policy. Cut off from Western markets, Moscow has shifted exports to Asia, offered steep discounts to keep energy revenue flowing, and used disinformation as a diplomatic tool. It has also revived its Soviet-era tactics of cultivating “strategic friction zones” in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.

What’s new is the normalization of its pariah status. Russia no longer tries to return to the Western fold. Instead, it’s building a bloc of sanctioned or semi-sanctioned states with shared grievances—China, Iran, North Korea, and parts of Latin America—who quietly coordinate to frustrate US influence.

Domestically, repression has intensified. But abroad, Russia is testing the limits of multipolar disorder. Its embrace of chaos is strategic: the more unpredictable the world, the more leverage it has.

Once anchored firmly within the Western bloc, Israel today finds itself increasingly adrift. Its controversial policies on Gaza, judicial reform, and settlements have eroded support among traditional allies. In response, Israel is doubling down on strategic hedges: cybersecurity dominance, arms exports, and pragmatic partnerships, from India to Azerbaijan.

Israel’s normalization with Arab states (the Abraham Accords) and military alignment with US defense tech still give it edge—but it’s also increasingly acting on its own terms. Recent strikes in Iran and Syria, and closer coordination with Gulf intelligence services, show a pivot toward unilateral deterrence.

In this emerging world order, Israel isn’t just surviving without full Western backing—it’s adapting. It remains one of the few states capable of autonomous regional power projection, albeit with rising diplomatic costs.

For business: Expect a further decoupling of supply chains—not just between the US and China, but across any jurisdiction that faces secondary sanctions, tech restrictions, or capital controls. Firms may need to rethink political risk exposure in places like Central Asia, the Gulf, and Southeast Europe.

For policymakers: The fragmentation of the global order complicates collective action. Climate pacts, trade regulation, and digital governance may stall as countries prioritize bilateral deals over multilateral frameworks. The G20 and WTO are already showing signs of strain.

For defense and intelligence communities: Tracking non-aligned power centers is now more critical. Triangular relationships—Russia-Iran-China, Israel-India-Gulf, or China-Brazil-Russia—are not easily categorized but could define flashpoints and fault lines in the next decade.

What binds these emergent powers isn’t ideology—it’s pragmatism. They are not building a new alliance like NATO or the Non-Aligned Movement. Instead, they are forming what some analysts call “shadow systems”: parallel diplomatic, financial, and military arrangements that operate just outside of Western visibility or approval.

These systems include alternatives to SWIFT for financial transactions, shared satellite surveillance networks, joint military exercises outside of UN mandates, and coordinated diplomatic vetoes in institutions like the UN Security Council. For example, Israel’s weapons tech ends up in hands aligned with Indian and Gulf interests, while Russia’s Wagner networks or successors still operate covertly across Africa, often in zones where Chinese-built infrastructure is also expanding.

This informal convergence creates a landscape where local conflicts can be exploited or managed through quiet coordination—without the need for formal treaties. It also means that traditional mechanisms of transparency, deterrence, or accountability no longer apply.

In short, a new world order isn’t being declared—it’s being improvised. And while it lacks the cohesion of post-WWII frameworks, its staying power lies in flexibility, speed, and mutual benefit among nations no longer content with US-dominated structures.

This isn’t just about power moving East—it’s about power becoming more fragmented, more contested, and more regionally defined. The US, once the guarantor of global order, now struggles to manage even selective engagement. China, Russia, and Israel are each demonstrating that regional dominance, strategic ambiguity, and alliance diversification can achieve more than global consensus.

The post–Cold War world promised liberal norms and economic integration. What’s emerging instead is a world of hedging, decoupling, and deterrence. The new game isn’t who leads, but who adapts fastest to a world without a referee.