Rare earth talks hint at tactical shift in US China trade

On the surface, the London meeting between top US and Chinese officials appears procedural—a continuation of stalled trade talks focused on rare earth access and advanced technology controls. But beneath the silence following Day 1, a subtler message is emerging: policy flexibility is on the table, albeit under highly conditional terms.

The US, according to early White House signals, is open to loosening some export controls in exchange for restored rare earth supply chains. This contrasts with its earlier hardline stance, particularly following the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act and the subsequent tightening of semiconductor export rules. If this easing proceeds, it marks a pragmatic—though not permanent—reassessment of strategic rigidity.

This is not the first time US policy has flexed under resource dependency pressure. In 2019, similar overtures were made when rare earth pricing spiked following Chinese threat signals. But those were short-lived. What differentiates this moment is the current overlap of inflationary energy inputs, AI-critical hardware demand, and post-pandemic supply fragility.

For China, the re-opening of rare earth export channels—if verified—would mirror selective liberalizations seen in prior cycles, often timed to geopolitical recalibration. It is unlikely to be full-spectrum. Strategic sectors such as magnet production and battery-grade refinement will almost certainly remain constrained.

From the vantage of regional fund allocators and central banks, this quiet signaling invites caution rather than optimism. Both Singapore’s GIC and Saudi Arabia’s PIF—major allocators to advanced tech and industrial infrastructure—will read this less as détente and more as hedging. The absence of a formal statement suggests both parties are testing market response before locking in real concessions.

For ASEAN policymakers, the inference is clear: supply chain diversification strategies remain relevant. Malaysia’s rare earth processing ambitions, for instance, are not sidelined by this dialogue—they are validated by it.

Sovereign investors are unlikely to reverse current exposure trimming to China-based industrials or US-listed semicap firms with China reliance. Instead, capital may continue tilting toward midstream enablers in third-party jurisdictions—Vietnam, Indonesia, and select Gulf players. FX reserves also remain on alert: any durable shift in US export policy would affect currency hedging strategies, especially in tech-exposed markets.

Despite early press optimism, this exchange should be interpreted as cautious signaling—not commitment. The US offer to ease export controls is neither codified nor uniform, and any Chinese concessions are likely transactional. Both sides are testing how much strategic ground can be negotiated without eroding domestic policy credibility.

What this signals, more than policy thaw, is a shared recognition that decoupling has cost—and that certain levers (rare earths, advanced magnets, niche semiconductors) remain uncomfortably mutual.